Correction (added 9/27): The number of U.S. soldiers in S. Korea is 28,500, not 37,000 as I wrote in this post. (Source: R. Holbrooke in the current [Sept/Oct '08] issue of Foreign Affairs, p.14.) This does not change the main point I was making.
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Sec. of Defense Robert Gates said today that the reinforcements being requested by U.S. generals in Afghanistan will not be available for deployment until spring 2009. We hear all the time that the demands being placed on the all-volunteer force by two ongoing wars are stretching it to a dangerously thin point, and I have no reason to doubt this.
At the same time, the U.S. still has, as far as I know, roughly 37,000 soldiers stationed in South Korea, 55 years after the armistice that ended (in a practical though not legal sense) the Korean War. The U.S. also has thousands of soldiers in Japan and a substantial number in Europe (albeit fewer than during the Cold War). Some of this military presence is no doubt required under the terms of existing alliances. But it's odd that relatively few people (outside of the 'usual suspects' so to speak) seem to have raised questions about the appropriateness of this distribution of military manpower (and womanpower) in a time of stretched forces.
The rationale for having 37,000 troops in South Korea has eluded me for years. They cannot really be serving any genuine deterrent function, in light of North Korea's million-man army, and if the point is to provide a trip-wire effect (i.e., a guarantee of U.S. intervention in the event of a North Korean invasion), then surely 8,000 soldiers (for example) would do that as reliably as 37,000. Do the terms of the alliance require maintenance of a specific number of American soldiers in South Korea? If not, what are they doing there? Does this make any sense? Maybe one of the many bloggers (or others) with more expertise in these matters than I possess can enlighten me on this point. I'd appreciate it.
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7 comments:
LFC
Is it still 37,000?
There has been somthing of a drawdown in recent years. I'm not sure of the total numbers.
Anyway the ground forces left in Korea are one manuver Brigade which does not make a lot of difference it the total picture.
As much as I, and I am sure you, hate agreeing with Donald Runsfeld pulling operational forces back from Korea was one of his goals. He accomplished much of it in the coming and going of units for the GWOT and Iraq, rotated them out temporailly and never returned them. Most of the Army's withdrawl ended up in Washington state.
I'll take your word that Rumsfeld did what you describe on this point, and I do agree with that particular action (at least the reduction-of- forces-in-Korea part of it). That might well exhaust my area of agreement with Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld will mainly be remembered for advocating going into Iraq (a mistake) with what turned to be insufficient forces and planning for the post-Saddam phase (also a mistake, obviously).
There is one primary reason we keep troop levels high in these countres: it demonstrates to our allies that we are invested in their security.
This makes sense, when you really think about it. If we are stationing 37,000 troops in South Korea, despite the fact that we are fighting two wars, it shows botht the S. Korean government and the S. Korean people that they are high enough up on our priority list to warrant such high numbers.
~T. Greer, who has written a couple of posts on how this kind of thing works effects our relationship with Japan.
t. greer,
I've looked at your post of June 9 on 'the future of East Asian security.' I just disagree w the view that a reduction in US troop levels in the region presages a retreat into 'isolationism' or indicates lack of US interest in, or commitment to, these countries. There are other ways to assure allies that they remain allies. Increase the number of top-level diplomatic visits, invite the South Korean pres and Japanese pm to attend the state of the union, engage in other substantive and symbolic forms of cooperation. The Korean war ended 55 years ago, the Cold War itself ended 17 years ago. We should find other ways of showing these countries we are "invested in their security" than keeping tens of thousands of troops on their soil indefinitely.
See the correction on # of US troops in S. Korea (top of main post).
I've looked at your post of June 9 on 'the future of East Asian security.' I just disagree w the view that a reduction in US troop levels in the region presages a retreat into 'isolationism' or indicates lack of US interest in, or commitment to, these countries. There are other ways to assure allies that they remain allies. Increase the number of top-level diplomatic visits, invite the South Korean pres and Japanese pm to attend the state of the union, engage in other substantive and symbolic forms of cooperation. The Korean war ended 55 years ago, the Cold War itself ended 17 years ago. We should find other ways of showing these countries we are "invested in their security" than keeping tens of thousands of troops on their soil indefinitely.
@LFC: I agree with much of what you say. However, it isn't my opinion that counts- it is the view of the Japanese and South Koreans that matter.
And from what I can tell, they do think that a withdrawal in troops constitutes either a lack of American interest, or a decline in American power.
Matsumura, the Japanese professor who penned the report my post was based on, gives an example of this, noting that most Japanese intellectuals and policy makers believe that the painful experiences America has had in Iraq and Afghanistan will lead it into a new age of isolationism.
The scary thing about this is that it doesn't matter if a drawdown in troops actually means that we are lest invested in Japanese security- that is how it will be perceived, and it is with this assumption Japanese policy makers will craft public policy.
This trend can also be seen among the Japanese populace themselves. As the result of a recent Pew Global Attitudes survey has shown, the majority of Japanese believe both that the U.S. is getting weaker and that it no longer considers about Japanese interests.
Now, can you tell me how significantly drawing down troop levels in Japan while simultaneously pressuring them to use THEIR Navy to refuel our Afghanistan-bound warships does anything to alter this impression? At what point will the Japanese conclude that our alliance is not worth their total dependence us?
See, this is what truly worries me. Iraq, Afghanistan- they are just distractions from the real show. We are living in the Pacific century. When historians 100 years hence look back they will say that it is what happened in Tokyo, Beijing, Seoul and Taipei that changed the course of history.
And truth be told, would rather have it change in our favor.
~T. Greer, afraid that he typed this too fast to make a good case.
I understand your point, but where we probably differ is on 1)the consequences of Japan adopting a more independent and/or assertive foreign policy, and 2)the extent to which traditional realpolitik/realist premises continue to apply to issues of regional security. I'll have to leave it at that for now.
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