Sunday, April 12, 2015
Shocked
Just over at the Duck and I see that Prof. Busby, in the Disqus thread attached to his post on the Iran nuclear framework deal, links to Kissinger and Schultz pieces in WSJ that apparently express rather serious (pulls a serious face) doubts about the framework. I haven't read the pieces -- for one thing, I assume they're gated; for another, life is too short -- but, to paraphrase Major whatever-his-last-name-was in that famous movie whose name I don't even have to mention, I'm shocked, shocked that Schultz and Kissinger have taken to the WSJ to express doubts about the framework.
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I have no feel for what the beltway mood on this is, but one driver may be the need to get a reasonable deal before a bad deal or none becomes inevitable. Iran-China trade has boomed, a Chinese state visit is scheduled, and Russia has just lifted the embargo on the sale of a sophisticated air defence system.
I do not expect, however, this rationale to carry much weight in the WJS.
Haven't been keeping up w the news well, but I think I did see/hear something about the Russian sale.
But yes, this reasoning prob won't fly w Wall St Journal. Or w Republicans in Congress. Headline in WaPo this a.m. is that Senate For. Rel. Cte. is taking up a bill that wd restrict Obama's ability to cut the deal. Not sure how that's even constitutional, given established presidential prerogatives in the int'l field, but we'll see...
White Hse and Senate have now apparently reached a temporary compromise. It "kicks the issue [of congressional power] down the road," as the lead WaPo graph puts it. Pretty much s.o.p. these days...
One point I made in my post is that the US perspective tends to be very narrow - to see this through the lens of US domestic politics. But if UN Security Council sanctions are lifted (and that's purely within presidential discretion, as all it needs is failure to cast a veto), then US sanctions will hardly matter. China, Japan, India, Russia and probably Europe will all pile in.
I think some in the administration might dimly see that the US has a weak hand here, but this is not something that can be acknowledged.
Peter,
It appears that the compromise the White Hse reached w the Senate may give the Senate, at least in theory, a way to disapprove the deal in a way that will constrain the Pres's discretion.
I need to get clearer on the details (was distracted listening to the news/analysis earlier this eve.), and when I have done so I may post something about this in next few days. My basic pt, though, is that while power struggles betw Congress and Pres may look like purely domestic politics, they can become something more than that when they affect promises the Pres has made to allies or negotiating partners (in this case the P-5) that certain steps will be taken by all in concert when Iran has met certain conditions. (Yes, there are things the Pres can do solely w/in his discretion, but if he has voluntarily given up some of that discretion as part of a compromise w Congress there may be a problem.)
More after I get clearer on the details...
Sorry, it's taken me a while to get back to this -- will have a (substantive, unlike this one) comment later today (or tonight).
I've now watched (belatedly) the NewsHr for 4/14, which contained a longish segment on the Whte Hse - Senate 'compromise'. I want to take back some of what I tentatively suggested above. It appears the main constraint on the Pres this imposes is that he commits not to waive temporarily the congressional sanctions, something he otherwise cd do, for a set period after a final deal w Iran is reached (30 days or 60 days, depending on when exactly the deal is finalized). Doesn't affect Pres's power to lift other sanctions (US Treas) and UN sanctions (in concert w other countries).
It's a way of ensuring that the Senate has a set time to express a view pro or con on the deal (and during that time cong. sanctions remain in place). If Senate votes the deal down, Pres. can then veto. If veto is upheld (i.e. not overridden, and it takes 67 votes to override a veto), Pres. can then go ahead and implement the deal, incl, presumably, the (temporary) waiver of cong. sanctions that's within his authority. (A *permanent* lifting of the cong. sanctions wd I assume still require a vote of, presumably, both houses of Congress. Though I'm actually not positive about the v. last pt (i.e., both houses.))
p.s. Welcome to the U.S. version of separation of powers, the (alleged) "genius" of the Founders, and all that ****...
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