I ran across this piece in Commentary (not on my usual circuit) by Bill Gertz last night. I haven't read it all and don't agree with the tone and general perspective, but it appears to be informative about internal U.S. policy debates on China and the Chinese military, so I'm passing it on here fwiw.
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4 comments:
LFC
It is a good overview of the policy debates with in the defense community in the last to decades.
A little confusing because it is summerizing several different understanidings of the problem and solutions.
Hank’s Eclectic Meanderings
I linked it with you in mind, Hank; thought you might find it interesting. (As I said, I have disagreements w the tone but haven't read the whole thing closely.)
LFC
The article, like much of the defense debate, dances around several questions.
1. What is the long term Chinese goals.
2. To what extent should we ID a potential enemy for training and planning. To name a potential enemy can be provocative. If you have a good idea who the enemy will be the ID is important to effective training, planning etc. During the cold war the US Military trained to fight "Aggressor" and later "OpFor" a fictional enemy whose armed forces just happened to mimic the Soviet Union. No one was fooled, of course, but it allowed training while avoiding provocation.
3. What is the military problem? Over the next 20 years China will be the armed forces to beat. If you can win against them you can win against anyone. Irregardless of the potential of a war with China they would be a useful foil for maneuvers etc. In the 1920's and 30's the Naval War College did exercises against the British-Japenese alliance. No one thought that would happen but a combination of the next two larges navies was good challenge.
4. Do you design for the specific problem (China) or the general problem (how to win against any one)?
5. Where might we be called to fight? We have obligations to counties off the Chinese coast. Though we also have obligations else where. If our politicians hold true to form the next war they get us into will not be what any one expects. (To be fair, if they expected it they might be able to avoid it.)
The Air land Battle concept is an attempt to solve the general problem, avoid provocations, but be realistic in being able to fight the potential toughest opponent thus whomever. I think Gertz would prefer a policy aimed at China by name. I would respectfully disagree with him in that conclusion.
Hank’s Eclectic Meanderings
I think a key point is your first question: What are China's goals, what are its intentions? Some say that b/c intentions are inherently difficult to determine and can change, you should only pay attention to capabilities. But it seems to me that wise policy requires some effort to determine China's intentions as best one can.
The hawkish (for lack of a better word) Aaron Friedberg, in the NYT column I mentioned a while back (previewing his current book), thinks China's aims are to "overawe its neighbors and dissuade the U.S. from coming to their aid" in a dispute, which is somewhat different from an aim of preparing to defeat the U.S. in a war. Gertz, by contrast, seems to think China's aim is the latter. In any case, for reasons you suggest and other reasons, the Pentagon can't and shouldn't say "we are doing this in response to China."
Your statement "if you can win against them [China] you can win against anyone" holds only for conventional interstate military conflicts, which are the least likely sorts of war, ISTM, actually to occur in the future. That is one reason I've been critical of the U.S. military 'pivot' to Asia (as has R. Kelly at DofM): it is based on assumptions that may no longer hold about the likelihood of mil. technology ever actually being used. Chinese mil. modernization and technological enhancements, in other words, may be occurring on a track that is not directly connected to China's policy intentions. There is a large Chinese mil. establishment (as in the U.S.), and its natural inclination is to improve its capabilities, but again, I'm not sure we can or should 'read off' or infer intentions from capabilities. It's a tricky issue, granted.
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