"A...less subtle guy than George W. Bush"

In this WaPo piece about Rick Perry's speech at Falwell's university, Richard Land of the Southern Baptist Convention is quoted as saying that Perry is a "more overt, less subtle guy than George W. Bush" and therefore will be inclined to talk more openly about his religion.

To which one appropriate response would seem to be: my God, must we go through this? My current lack of a functioning television begins to seem more and more, um, providential.

The decline of war (Part I)

Joshua Goldstein's piece in Foreign Policy, based on his new book Winning the War on War, will interest a lot of readers, not only IR types. In this post -- the first of a two-part discussion -- I will make some brief-ish comments on his Foreign Policy article. The second part of this discussion, which will appear in due course, will contain some broader ruminations about the relationship between global politics and global economics (no small, narrow subjects here, folks!).

Goldstein observes that the post-Cold War era, and especially the decade just passed, has been remarkably peaceful by historical standards. Citing research done by Lacina and Gleditsch at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, he notes that "the last decade has seen fewer war deaths" -- on average about 55,000 a year -- "than any decade in the past 100 years." Wars of all types, including civil wars, have decreased over the past 20 years.

What accounts for this decline of war? The article hints at a few possible explanations, but it's only at the end that Goldstein mentions what I'm inclined to believe is the most basic and consequential of the possible causes.

He writes that "armed conflict has declined in large part because armed conflict has fundamentally changed. Wars between big national armies all but disappeared along with the Cold War, taking with them the most horrific kinds of mass destruction." No doubt in the book Goldstein gives figures on how many "wars between big national armies" -- i.e., conventional interstate wars -- there were during the Cold War. The last war directly between great powers was either the Korean War or World War II (depending on whether you think China qualified as a great power at the time of the Korean War), and as Goldstein notes, the Korean War "effectively ended nearly 60 years ago." So there has not been a great-power war since either 1953 or 1945, depending on one's definitions. The end of the Cold War may have contributed to a change in the character of armed conflict, but the more basic change, I would suggest, is that great-power war as an 'institution' of international society seems effectively to have ceased to exist. [P.s. Of course some people thought the same thing in the period before 1914 and they turned out to be wrong, to put it mildly. But the situation is not analogous, for reasons I can go into in the comments or elsewhere, if anyone is interested.]

Why? Could shifts in the balance of power have something to do with it? Goldstein observes that "relative U.S. power and worldwide conflict have waned in tandem over the past decade," adding that the "best precedent for today's emerging world order may be the Concert of Europe...." The idea that a great-power concert, which today would include of course certain non-European powers, might be emerging (or might have already emerged) is not new. However, the heyday of the Concert of Europe (if I remember right) didn't last all that long (roughly, between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the Crimean War) and its operation was based in large part on shared reactionary values among the main European powers. This could be seen as either a pedantic irrelevancy or as casting some doubt on its suitability as an analogy, depending on one's inclination.

At the end of the piece Goldstein mentions that norms about war have changed, and this seems to be at the heart of the matter. Not only have norms about the protection of civilians changed; as J. Mueller, C. Fettweis, and others have argued, there is reason to think that great-power wars have become normatively unacceptable to great powers themselves. If correct, this is of course consonant with the main lines of Goldstein's argument, even if the emphases may differ somewhat. Btw, I'm sure his book (which I have not yet seen) goes into much greater detail, so readers interested in the subject should consult it rather than just the FP article.

Another p.s.: The decline of war also connects in a particular way with Foucault on biopower (oh no! I hear you crying), something which I learned a while back from a discussion on another blog. I'll get to this later (good, I hear you saying. In fact, why not make it never). Tsk, tsk, why can't the IR types all get along?

Krauthammer outdoes himself

Every time I think Charles Krauthammer cannot possibly write anything worse than the column he has just written, he surprises me: he writes something worse.

His column denying that the War on Terror was an overreaction to 9/11 contains the classic elements of a baseless argument: straw men, irrelevant rhetorical flourishes, and bad historical analogies. The analogies to World War II are especially ludicrous. He implies that "we" defeated al-Qaeda in the present period just as "we" defeated the Axis powers in World War II.

Just a couple of little problems with this: World War II was a conflict against an enemy far more formidable than al-Qaeda, and it was one which demanded some kind of sacrifice from huge swaths of the population. WW2 was fought by an army -- or I should say armies -- of conscripts, of draftees; the WoT has been fought by armies of professional soldiers, in the case of the U.S. increasingly separated from the population, and whose sacrifices have not been shared by the population at large.

Krauthammer points out that the financial collapse and Great Recession were not caused by the War on Terror. I don't know of anyone who claims they were. Krauthammer is taking statements that the WoT "bankrupted" the country a bit too literally; there are different kinds of bankruptcy, as anyone as well acquainted with the English language as Krauthammer must realize.

Most damagingly for Krauthammer's argument, the invasion of Iraq toppled an ugly regime to be sure, but one which had nothing to do with 9/11. If that doesn't constitute an overreaction, then the word has no meaning.

Krauthammer is an intelligent person who writes stupid things. There must be a name for this phenomenon, but if there isn't, then maybe it's time to coin a new verb: to Krauthammer.

'Familial capitalism' in France

Via the French Politics blog, a brief book notice in Le Monde. Of the 200 biggest French businesses in 2008, 76 were under "family control," up from 62 twenty years earlier. "Family control" could mean a couple of different things I suppose, but the gist is clear enough.

Not another one, please

Bob Gates, according to the Checkpoint Washington blog at WaPo (here), is to become chancellor at Wm & Mary and is planning two books: a memoir and "a treatise on leadership."

Gates is widely respected but please, not another treatise on leadership. I don't read such things (not having any particular reason to) but the mere thought of another one's coming into existence is irksome.

Also there's a piece in the Style section comparing Princeton economists Alan Krueger and Paul Krugman. There are one or two substantive points in there but first you have to wade through stuff about which one plays tennis, which one looks "mildly" like a Hobbit (sic), and so on. (Sorry, no link on this one. I don't get paid enough.)

Does the 'sovereignty debate' matter?

Update: I've now read Slaughter's latest entry in the debate, and at least on a theoretical level I tend to agree with the "walk and chew gum" formula: sovereignty as it's coming to be understood implies both a state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its borders (at least in the normal run of things) and a duty to act in non-exterminatory ways toward its citizens. As Slaughter herself appears to acknowledge, this hardly resolves all the practical problems, but as a general formula it seems unobjectionable.
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I would be lying if I'd said I have read with extremely close attention the recent blog posts by A.-M. Slaughter (here), J. Foust (here), D.P. Trombly (here), and others about the implications of the Libya intervention for the notion of state sovereignty. But the gist is that Slaughter wrote a post at The Atlantic saying that R2P and its application in Libya means that the "nature of sovereignty has fundamentally changed," Foust and Trombly took exception, and they were off.

Guess what? None of them is completely right. (You knew I was going to say that.) I think Slaughter is probably exaggerating when she implies that the notion of sovereignty as it is traditionally understood by international lawyers is dead -- to the extent she has implied that -- and Foust and Trombly are wrong to suggest that the 19th and 20th-century (note: their periodization) concept of sovereignty is as much about preventing civil war as it is about preventing external intervention in a state's 'internal affairs'. The modern idea of state sovereignty as enshrined for instance in Art. 2(7) of the UN Charter has more to do with the prerogatives of governments (states) than anything else. R2P has widened and formalized a traditional exception rather than completely upended the received notion of sovereignty, or so I would be inclined to argue.

Anyway, does the whole debate matter? I'm not sure it does. It gives IR types another subject to argue about, but whether it has any real importance beyond that is questionable. Governments will continue to make decisions about intervention for a variety of reasons, but whether any policy-makers will first sit down and reach a position on whether sovereignty has 'fundamentally changed' is, I think, doubtful. But this is, admittedly, pure speculation.

Added on 9/5: See also J. Ulfelder here.

Digging out an old proposal: a UN 'contact group' for Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan

Back in December '08 I blogged about an article by B. Rubin and A. Rashid [link will be added later] that advocated setting up a UN contact group to facilitate dialogue between India and Pakistan on the issues of Kashmir and Afghanistan. They argued that steps toward resolving some of Pakistan's anxieties about its borders (presumably in both the legal and practical senses) could help reduce Pakistan's motives -- or more specifically, the motives of parts of its army and intelligence service -- to support the Afghan Taliban and other militant groups.

Some relevant aspects of the situation, of course, have changed since Dec. '08. For one thing, U.S.-Pakistan relations have deteriorated (in light of the drone campaign and the killing of bin Laden, among other things), and the U.S. has suspended some military aid to Pakistan. But the future of Afghanistan, especially after the last U.S. combat forces have left, remains as much an open question now as it was at the end of '08. Pakistan's connections with the Afghan Taliban, via elements of the army and ISI, have also not ceased, as far as I'm aware. The Kashmir problem remains, of course, unresolved (btw, the UN has had a small military observer, a/k/a peacekeeping, force along the Line of Control since 1949. The UN spent $16 million on it in 2010-11 according to its website). So if the proposal for a UN contact group made sense in Dec. '08, it would seem still to make sense. The UN has a lot on its plate, to be sure, but that in itself is not a good reason for not adding one more item (double negative, sorry).

Hollywood and the military (continued)

I promised a bit more on the history of relations between Hollywood and the U.S. military. Some may be familiar with the series of films Why We Fight, produced during World War II under the auspices of the War Department (as it was then called) and directed by Frank Capra, but I knew little or nothing about it until I read part of Benjamin Alpers's Dictators, Democracy, and American Public Culture (Univ. of N. Carolina Press, 2003).

Alpers writes that the U.S. government "saw knowledge of the facts as essential to the morale of U.S. troops in a war against fanatical belief systems" (p.175), and the Why We Fight series was thus "built around the notion that factual knowledge about the war was the best basis for troop morale" (p.178). However, the films were "ultimately more factitious than factual" (p.179).

Much of the footage was...not what it claimed to be. Following a cinematic tradition established long before by newsreels, the Why We Fight series included footage from Hollywood features passed off as actual battle footage, staged scenes of life in the Axis countries, and captured footage taken entirely out of context.... Capra defended [this], maintaining that it was simply the most effective way to package fact. (p.179)

However, subsequent research on the films' impact on soldiers showed that "although the films did impart greater factual information about the war, this information had...no effect whatsoever on morale or combat motivation." (p.180)

As Alpers's discussion in the same chapter (called "This is the Army") suggests, the impact of Hollywood during WW2 was probably greater on civilians, as movies deployed the convention of the multi-ethnic combat unit as a symbol of American democracy and pluralism. Of course, this ran up against the awkward fact of racial segregation, both in the army and at home. Hollywood, not surprisingly, found it difficult to square this circle (see p. 170).

My own impressionistic sense -- not having researched this -- is that the relationship between Hollywood and the military began to turn a bit more adversarial during the first decades of the Cold War, with movies like Dr. Strangelove. By the Vietnam era, the splits in U.S. society were reflected in the movies, with John Wayne for instance continuing to make pro-war films while others made anti-war ones. (I think Apocalypse Now will probably be the most-viewed of these years from now, although there were a raft of them, including Platoon, The Deer Hunter, Born on the Fourth of July, and so on.)

As the Sirota piece linked in a previous post indicates, Top Gun represents a swing of the pendulum back toward celebration of militarism (not quite the right word, perhaps, but it will do). A trickle of dissent begins to return with the movies made after the first Gulf War (not that I saw any of them, I don't think), and this trickle becomes more of a stream with the movies of the current period that deal with the post-9/11 conflicts. Many of these (e.g., The Hurt Locker, In the Valley of Elah) I have not seen, but I did see Stop-Loss (2008) and Brothers (2009). I had to look up the titles of both of these on IMDB just now -- I remembered the actors but not the titles. (One of the joys of being middle-aged.) Stop-Loss was better than Brothers, as I recall, although the latter had its moments. I also saw (but on DVD not in a theater) a movie about Iraq with Matt Damon in it. Again, I don't remember the title and this time I'm not going to bother looking it up. Matt Damon fans will probably know the movie I'm talking about it and everyone else will probably not care too much. It was not great, but in terms of its politics definitely quite critical of the U.S. role, or at least of the military/occupation hierarchy.

P.s. There have also been, of course, documentaries on recent conflicts. E.g., on Afghanistan, 'Restrepo,' which I've mentioned before, and 'Armadillo,' which I haven't seen but which V. Yadav writes about here.

P.p.s. I've now seen The Hurt Locker. Worth watching.

NATO and "free markets"

I just heard a broadcast (on C-Span radio) of part of a discussion held last week by the Atlantic Council on "Libya and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance" (that may not have been the exact title of the meeting, but it's close). Several aspects of this discussion I found somewhat jarring. One was the use by speakers of the phrase "free markets" when referring to the values shared by NATO members, as in "democracy and free markets."

I dislike the phrase 'free markets' for a number of reasons and I was a bit surprised, though I probably shouldn't have been, to find it being used, apparently as a piece of boilerplate, in this context. If it is meant as a synonym for "capitalism" (the similar phrase "free enterprise" is sometimes used in this way), why not just say "capitalism"? But especially given the different varieties of capitalist economic systems represented by the member states of NATO, one could argue that an alliance commitment to spreading and/or defending capitalism would be odd, an argument that would apply to "free markets" as well.

One of the speakers at the Atlantic Council session, responding to a question about how to answer criticisms that NATO had strayed quite far from its original purpose, said that the alliance is a "living, breathing entity" that has adapted itself to new challenges etc., and he referred to the Strategic Concept adopted at the NATO summit in Lisbon last November. I just downloaded this document, and glancing at the opening paragraphs I see a reference to the shared commitment of member states to "individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law." Nothing about "free markets."

Hollywood & the military: a bit of historical amnesia

A few days ago David Sirota published a piece in which he claimed that the movie Top Gun started a Pentagon-Hollywood alliance, a 'military-entertainment complex'. In fact that alliance goes back at least to the 1940s, albeit with ups and downs over the years. More on this later.

"Realism is stuck in the 19th century"

The quote is from remarks by Randall Schweller at a roundtable on Charles Glaser's Rational Theory of International Politics held at last year's APSA annual meeting. Video here.

Note to readers

Posting will resume here in September [added later: or possibly a bit earlier] but probably at a slower pace than during the first part of the year (so expect longer intervals between posts). Incidentally, the few regular readers may find it more convenient to get the posts via RSS feed (see "subscribe" -- misleading word, since it doesn't cost anything -- on the right-hand-side column). I've never used feeds myself but I know that a lot of people do use them.
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P.s. Hurricane note: No one knows yet precisely how badly the area where I live (a bit north of D.C., west of I-95) will be affected; to judge from the media reports, however, those further north are supposed to bear the brunt as it moves up the coast. So to anyone in Pa., NY, NJ, etc. who may be reading -- be safe. (Ditto N. Carolina and Va.) Btw I remember Hurricane Isabel about 8 years ago -- power knocked out, trees swaying madly, etc. For some reason it doesn't seem to get mentioned much in the news coverage of Irene. In terms of scope -- i.e. geographic area covered -- I guess Irene dwarfs it.

Biden and China's one-child policy (brief interruption in the break)

I just read this WaPo editorial about V.P. Biden in China. The Republicans apparently jumped all over Biden's remark that he "understood" China's one-child policy even though it was "unsustainable" from the standpoint of future worker-to-retiree ratios. Biden's office then issued a statement "clarifying" that the V.P. opposes not only the coercive aspects of the one-child policy but also the policy as a whole.

Although the coercive aspects of the policy are bad, if the policy were based on incentives alone would it warrant a denunciation? Probably not. The Chinese government did have rational reasons, when the policy was adopted, to want to moderate the pressures of population on resources, infrastructure etc., and those reasons probably remain somewhat valid. No one, of course, can approve of forced sterilizations or coerced abortions, but a non-coercive one-child policy would not be irrational, despite the concern about worker-to-retiree ratios. It's a bit annoying that Biden's office, in its clarification, apparently did not draw this distinction.

Break

I'll be taking a break from posting in August.

Quote of the day

Jacob Stein writes a regular column for the D.C. Bar's magazine. His pieces are anecdotal and reflective and often full of interesting quotations. In his column in the current issue Stein quotes a definition of "litigious paranoia" from the famous 11th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica. It says among other things that the "basic emotion [involved in the condition] is vanity...."

After quoting the paragraph-length definition, Stein adds:

This was written before Freudian psychoanalysis.... If the entry were rewritten today, the only change would be to reframe the diagnosis of vanity into narcissism, the narcissist being the person thinking of no one but oneself. Or, as George Eliot (not Freud or Jung) said, "What we see exclusively, we see out of proportion to reality."

I suppose it is arguable that an aspect of George Eliot's genius was her ability to make a tautology sound like a profundity. In any case, it's a pretty good line.

Government has been a job-creator (even if the GOP may not know it)

"No taxes on job-creators" (meaning owners of small and large businesses and anyone making over a certain amount of money, say a quarter-million a year) has been a mantra of some Republican participants in the debt/deficit debate. In view of that, the following may be of interest inasmuch as it shows that government, supposedly the root of all evil, has been a major job-creator.

Between 1990 and 2008, the number of employed workers in the United States grew from about 122 million to about 149 million. Of the roughly 27 million jobs created during that period, 98 percent were in the so-called nontradable sector of the economy, the sector that produces goods and services that must be consumed domestically. The largest employers in the U.S. nontradable sector were the government (with 22 million jobs in 2008) and the health-care industry (with 16 million jobs in 2008). Together, the two industries created ten million new jobs between 1990 and 2008, or just under 40 percent of total additions.

-- Michael Spence, "The Impact of Globalization on Income and Employment," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2011, p.30 (emphasis added).

Goin' to the chapel

Here (paragraphs 8 to 10).

[added later] A constitutional amendment requiring a balanced budget is insanity. There are times when a balanced budget is desirable and other times when it isn't. One learns this on the second day (maybe the third) of any basic economics course.

Silliness on stilts: Friedman's "McDonald's theory"

Maybe the heat has gotten to them: a prominent IR prof/blogger (Drezner) and a prominent writer/blogger (Mead) have a go-round about a so-called "theory" promulgated by a prominent ... well, whatever Friedman is (careful, no bad words allowed). Drezner is basically right, but I don't know why he's wasting his time on this in the first place. He suggests that a kernel can be salvaged from the Friedman "theory" because two countries with McDonald's, although they can go to war (see his examples), may be less likely to do so. He then proceeds to admit that this proposition, even if true, is not useful because the presence of McDonald's is an "intervening variable." He nonetheless urges some student to write a thesis testing the 'war-is-less-likely-between-countries-with-McDonald's' proposition.

However, 'traditional' interstate war (country A fighting country B, without the complicating presence of any internal armed conflict) is so rare these days that the proposed test is, IMO, of minimal interest. Friedman's "theory" is not a theory and Drezner's weaker version of it is a waste of time, virtually by his own admission. I blame John Sides for drawing my attention to Drezner's post: it's all the fault of someone who doesn't even study international relations. Figures.

The U.S. left and Obama

It's no secret that large numbers of progressives or left-liberals (or whatever label one prefers) are unhappy with Pres. Obama's performance. Although there are some grounds for that unhappiness, I think part of its source may be the high expectations generated by the 2008 campaign. But presidents, especially in recent years (and with the possible exception of G.W. Bush), never behave in office exactly the way their campaigning suggests that they might; they move to the center, for lack of a better phrase, and when the center itself has shifted, or is perceived to have shifted, that will produce disappointments (e.g., in Obama's case, the insufficiently large stimulus package, compromise on Bush tax cut extensions, certain questionable foreign policy decisions, etc.). The disappointments, however, should not obscure the real, if measured, achievements of the Obama admin (e.g., health care reform, saving the domestic auto industry, fulfillment of pledge to end U.S. combat ops in Iraq, two pretty good Supreme Court appointments, etc.). Obama has not changed the underlying structure of the U.S.'s 'winner-take-all' politics (Hacker/Pierson's phrase), but changes to this kind of entrenched system are difficult, to say the least.

Disenchantment with Obama on the left can produce some unhinged judgments, as in this comment from a recent CT thread:

Obama should just do an LBJ. He won’t, of course, but that’s because he’s not as honorable as LBJ.

That is absurd. LBJ decided not to run for re-election in 1968 in the face of widespread discontent among Democrats and others, confirmed by Eugene McCarthy's strong showing in the New Hampshire primary, about his Vietnam policy. LBJ began an escalation of the Vietnam war under deceitful pretenses (the Tonkin Gulf resolution) and persisted in a policy that was misguided and morally dubious (to say the least). One can parcel out blame among his advisors and adduce all kinds of sophisticated and probably correct explanations about why LBJ's Vietnam policymaking took the course that it did, but ultimately it was a failed policy for which LBJ, as president, could not escape responsibility. Obama has made no mistakes of anything like a comparable magnitude. LBJ was in many respects a tragic figure; indeed, Eric Goldman wrote a book called The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson. No serious person will ever write a book called The Tragedy of Barack Obama. The comparison is groundless.

Historical footnote: On March 25, 1968, roughly a week before he announced he would not seek re-election, LBJ was advised by the so-called Wise Men (elders of the foreign policy establishment including Acheson, Lovett, McCloy) to change tack and start de-escalating (and negotiating). For ultra-hawk Walt Rostow, Johnson's national security advisor, this represented the 'death' of the U.S. foreign policy establishment (see D. Milne, America's Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War [2008], p.222). It was more like the establishment finally coming to its senses.

How changes in British welfare and housing policy are changing London

A bit off the usual track for this blog, but I saved this WaPo article last month and thought it might be worth linking to. Striking to an American is how actively the British government, until the recent austerity measures, subsidized rents etc. to ensure a level of socioeconomic diversity in central London neighborhoods. I think it's fair to say that a comparably far-ranging policy in the U.S. would be out of the question, regardless of the state of the economy.