Update (4/8): Just to mention that N. Lees, who has occasionally commented here, has resumed posting at his blog; his posts are always worth reading.
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In the wake of the Iran nuclear 'framework' announcement, a couple of commenters at Internet sites I occasionally visit have suggested that Iran would make a good 'strategic partner' (in the words of this commenter) for the U.S., because the U.S. and Iran share interests in, among other things, opposing ISIS and Al-Qaeda. That may be, but there are other issues (e.g., support of Hezbollah and of Assad) where U.S. and Iranian interests diverge. Note also that when Iran was heavily involved in aiding the Iraqi army's recent effort to retake Tikrit from ISIS, the U.S. hung back; when Iraq requested U.S. airstrikes after the offensive had stalled, Iranian involvement in the offensive apparently diminished (I say "apparently" because I'm sure that the situation on the ground was extremely tangled and complicated and I did not even try to follow it closely).
In short, I don't think the "let's make Iran our new strategic partner in the region" response makes a lot of sense. It's the opposite of those who are groundlessly concerned that reaching a nuclear deal with Iran somehow amounts to recognizing its putative hegemony in the region. Carts should not be put before horses. Get the nuclear deal done and see how that goes, then worry about broader issues of the future of U.S.-Iran relations. The amount of time it took to get the U.S.-India nuclear deal ironed out -- a civil (i.e. non-military) nuclear deal with a country that the U.S. has much better relations with than it does with Iran -- would suggest that no one should think implementing the details of the Iran 'framework' is going to be especially easy.
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I agree fully. I think there's a lot of wishful thinking around the 'Iran as strategic partner' rhetoric, or at least very little thinking through about how specifically a 'strategic partnership' with Iran would (1) ever come into existence (2) be all that better than what currently exists.
I think some of this line of thinking exists primarily in opposition to the Saudi relationship, but I also think a large part of it is doing precisely what 'we' (the royal we) complain about with the US foreign policy establishment, ie imagining that you can develop these strategic partnerships and control events in the region.
I think more broadly the problem is with 'strategic partnerships' in general. (at least the sorts of relationships the US has cultivated regionally)
I also think a large part of it is doing precisely what 'we' (the royal we) complain about with the US foreign policy establishment, ie imagining that you can develop these strategic partnerships and control events in the region. I think more broadly the problem is with 'strategic partnerships' in general. (at least the sorts of relationships the US has cultivated regionally)
An interesting point. I hadn't really thought about in those terms. I was more thinking in terms of not being able to sever long-standing relationships (e.g., U.S./Saudi) at the drop of hat. It's not that easy.
But you may be right that the bigger problem is with the
kinds of relationships the US has cultivated in the region. Is the U.S/Saudi relation
different in substantial ways from, say, the U.S. relation
w allies in other regions? I'm sure it's different in specifics, but is there something more 'unhealthy' (for lack of a better word) about it?
I don't really know the answer. Just throwing the question out there.
And meanwhile I have a comment sitting in moderation in a CT thread. (Which is just as well since I told myself I wd cut down on the amt of time I waste there.)
What has happened to CT threads? Haven't they become somewhat more boring and predictable? Or maybe it's just the one I was reading now.
The other thing at CT is that some of the main posters are no longer reading their threads. Of course if I had Henry Farrell's schedule and obligations I wouldn't be blogging at CT at all, but it's a bit rich for him not to follow his own thread and then come in at comment no.500 or whatever and say "someone has told me that [commenter X] advocated genocide of the aborigines. He is hereby banned."
Esp. silly since everyone knows commenter X can come back under a diff. name and no one will do sh*t about it. Sorry. Off topic venting.
I'm trying to cut down on all internet commenting these days. It escalates too easily and you end up getting stuck in days long arguments about god knows what. Also the 'poor me' spieling from the CT front pagers is starting to annoy me ! I dont think the comments are really the problem, I like most (all really) of the people who comment there. The fish, as they say, rots from ....I'll leave it there ; )
(I'll be back tomorrow on the first question.Just running off soon for the night)
Actually, i think that, about the front pagers, is a bit unfair on my part, and I shouldnt have associated it with your blog. I guess their interests just arent my interests really. Which is hardly their fault. I started reading during the financial crisis (specifically really when Niamh started posting) to learn more about it, but that's sort of petered out.
Anyway, I wont say anymore on that for the time being ! (re the US foreign policy thing, Joel Migdal has written a new book 'shifting sands' which deals with the question directly. I havent read it yet but could be worth checking out)
@Ronan
Actually, i think that, about the front pagers, is a bit unfair on my part, and I shouldnt have associated it with your blog.
No problem. It's clearly labeled as your comment and well within the bounds here. (This is still a quite low-traffic site and I've never set out a formal commenting policy b/c haven't felt the need for one. But it wd be the usual, obvs stuff.)
So no, I don't mind that you mentioned the CT front-pagers critically. I will say that blogging is time-consuming and i don't know how Loomis at LGM, for ex., does his real job and writes bks and posts as much as he does. (As for CT, I've been reading the blog perhaps longer than you, though not since it started, more like since '07/'08, something like that.)
Ok, signing off now here for a while. Prob won't check back till c.5pm tomorrow my time.
LFC - I dont know the answer to your first question either, and anything I have to say on how the US cultivated relationships in other regions would be purely speculation.
I mentioned Migdal's book though because I think this is the question he deals with (as I said above I havent read it, although ive listened to a few talks he's given on it, an article and review and read the first chapter online)
Very, very simply and with caveats to take my interpretation with a pinch of salt, he argues (i think) that the US mainly used concepts of regional security which they developed in Europe (ie two main power brokers to maintain regional peace)throughout the world, and this policy didnt suit other contexts which were more different than similar to what existed in Europe. He talks about the Middle East specifically but I think also says it was true more generally.
Why is the Middle East different than other regions ? Or is it ? I'm not sure. Certainly (as I think you mentioned in a post previously) US policy in East Asia has been quite destructive (Indonesia, Vietnam etc) I think there are a number of factors that might make the Middle East more central to US (perceived) interests (obviously oil, Israel, terrorism geography etc)
I dont know what a comparison to other regions would say though
@Ronan: Thanks. Will come back later and comment more properly. Pressed for time today.
he argues (i think) that the US mainly used concepts of regional security which they developed in Europe (ie two main power brokers to maintain regional peace) throughout the world, and this policy didnt suit other contexts which were more different than similar to what existed in Europe.
I think I wd have to read Migdal, or at least a review, to judge this.
On the M.E. generally, Peter T's argument in his posts here that the region isn't more complicated than others, US policy has just been less successful there, made some sense to me. Though I think a counter-case might be made for the M.E.'s greater complexity, esp. now. But the question why US policy over the decades was less successful, or why, in terms that Peter used, some basic realities were ignored, remains open.
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